LST/LRT-backed CDP protocol issuing the mkUSD stablecoin and ULTRA (LRT-backed). Users open Troves with wstETH, rETH, sfrxETH, cbETH, WBETH, etc. and mint mkUSD against them. Suffered an $11.6M flash-loan exploit in March 2024 (Trove migration bug) — protocol resumed operations April 2024, but TVL never fully recovered; treat as legacy / orange-zone.
- 01minting mkUSD against wstETH / rETH / sfrxETH / cbETH / WBETH
- 02leveraged LST exposure via a Liquity-style CDP
- 03LRT-collateralized borrowing via ULTRA
- 04yield stacking on top of LST collateral
- pnpm add viem
| Variable | Scope | Description |
|---|---|---|
| NEXT_PUBLIC_PRISMA_BORROWER_OPS | Client | Prisma BorrowerOperations contract on Ethereum mainnet — entry point for opening/adjusting Troves. |
| NEXT_PUBLIC_MKUSD_ADDRESS | Client | mkUSD ERC-20 stablecoin on Ethereum mainnet: 0x4591DBfF62656E7859Afe5e45f6f47D3669fBB28. |
Integrate Prisma's CDP. To open a Trove: approve the LST collateral (e.g. wstETH at `0x7f39C581F595B53c5cb19bD0b3f8dA6c935E2Ca0`), then call `BorrowerOperations.openTrove(troveManager, account, maxFeePercentage, collateralAmount, debtAmount, upperHint, lowerHint)` where `troveManager` is the per-collateral TroveManager (Liquity v1-style architecture forked into per-LST silos). The user receives mkUSD; adjust collateral/debt with `adjustTrove(...)`, close with `closeTrove(...)`. Stake mkUSD into the StabilityPool to earn liquidation gains (in collateral) plus PRISMA emissions. ULTRA is the LRT-backed sibling stablecoin — same architecture, different collateral set. ALWAYS warn users that Prisma was exploited in March 2024; surface the post-mortem link and the current TVL/collateral composition before any deposit.
- ⚑Prisma was exploited for $11.6M in March 2024 via a `DelegatedZap` Trove-migration bug — even though the protocol resumed and stablecoins remained overcollateralized, depositor confidence and TVL collapsed; surface this risk prominently.
- ⚑Each LST collateral has its own TroveManager with its own oracle and liquidation params; a bad oracle on one collateral does not contaminate others, but neither does liquidity flow between them.
- ⚑mkUSD peg depends on Curve mkUSD/FRAX-BP and mkUSD/crvUSD pool depth — pool drainage during stress (as happened post-exploit) can persistently de-peg mkUSD; check current peg before quoting.
- ⚑LST collateral carries de-peg risk (wstETH, rETH, etc. can trade below ETH-equivalent) on top of CDP risk — a sharp LST de-peg can cause cascading liquidations before oracles update.
- ⚑Liquidations are processed via the StabilityPool first, then redistribution — if the StabilityPool is empty (as after the exploit), liquidations redistribute debt onto remaining troves, raising everyone's effective LTV.
- ⚑PRISMA token emissions and gauge weights are governance-controlled by vePRISMA holders (a curve-style war) — incentive APYs can change weekly without notice.
- ⚑Project activity has slowed materially since the exploit; treat docs/contracts as semi-frozen and verify on-chain state (TVL, last interaction, oracle freshness) before integrating.